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This dissertation focuses on analysing the economics of an open-access fishery and on 
evaluating the effects of government subsidy programmes on the fishing industry. The 
dissertation adopts a sustainable development perspective for assessing the effects of 
subsidies. Although the key focus of the research is on the economic effects of subsidies, the 
ecological and social dimensions are taken into account. The dissertation integrates the 
theoretical frameworks of bioeconomics and vessel economics of fisheries and empirical 
investigations to examine the research problems. The empirical analyses are applied to 
Vietnam’s open-access offshore fisheries operating in the South China Sea (SCS).  
The first result is that open-access fisheries can create net benefits for society, which 
are termed intra-marginal rent. Regarding the economic dimension, the Vietnamese 
Government’s subsidy programmes had positive effects on the profitability of the 
investigated vessels in the years of the analysis. However, the profits were eroded over the 
years. The results indicate that the Government’s intervention by use of subsidies led to a 
reduction in the actual surpluses of the investigated offshore fisheries compared with the 
situation with no intervention. Therefore, the offshore fisheries could be profitable for the 
vessel owners in the short term without being socially optimal in the long term. Regarding the 
ecological dimension, the estimate of fish stock proxy indices shows that the fish resources in 
Vietnam’s offshore waters are most likely to be biologically overfished. In relation to the 
social dimension, the dissertation addresses the area of human well-being, particularly 
concerning the aspect of income and rent distribution. The larger vessels (i.e., those with a 
larger engine) received relatively more support from the 2010 subsidy programme than the 
smaller ones and earned most of the super-profit as well as the intra-marginal rent generated. 
The 2010 subsidy schemes provided relatively more benefits for large vessels than for small 
ones, and this is the opposite case to the 2008 arrangements. However, the bigger subsidies 
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for larger vessels did not help all of them to achieve a higher level of economic performance. 
The average treatment effect of the subsidies on the rent of the largest vessels was negative. 
In addition, the Government subsidy programmes generated benefits for the vessel owners 
rather than for the crewmembers. The large-scale vessels generally provided a greater annual 
income for crewmembers, although insignificant effects of the subsidy arrangements on the 
income for crewmembers were found.  
Overall, the dissertation indicates that the Government’s subsidy interventions have 
had a negative impact on the sustainable development of the offshore fisheries. The design of 
such subsidy programmes provides incentives for fishers to invest in their fishing effort and 
capacity. The policy goal of improving the income and profitability of the fisheries by the use 
of subsidies can be achieved only in the short term under the open-access fishing scheme. In 
the long term, the environmental deterioration will counter the effect of the subsidies on 
economic and social sustainability.  
The dissertation recommends that it would be wise for Vietnam to seek to operate a 
fisheries management system that is designed to prevent overfishing and overcapacity and to 
promote the recovery of overfished stocks for offshore fisheries, hence approaching the goals 
of sustainable development. It also important for Vietnam to enhance its offshore fishing 
programmes to reduce the pressure on the already-overfished coastal resources through 
support that does not contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. However, international 
negotiations and the existing dispute settlements based on international law should firstly be 
used to identify an internationally recognized delineation of the SCS to avoid encouraging the 
presence of countries’ own vessels in this region with the use of subsidies. The establishment 
of an effectively cooperative fishing regime in the SCS region should be promoted. The calls 
for sharing the total allowable catch among the involved countries should be considered.  
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Finally, the dissertation contributes to the further development of the methods for 
comparing the economic performance and efficiency of vessels by the standardization of 
fishing effort and the estimation of a Salter diagram. It extends the traditional economic 
model of Gordon to illustrate the existence of intra-marginal rent for an open-access fishery 
with heterogeneous vessels and to model the static effects of revenue-enhancing lump sum 
subsidies on the fishery and individual vessels. It provides the first contribution to the 
literature regarding the treatment effect evaluation of a subsidy programme on a Southeast 
Asian fishery. It also uses different fish stock measures to estimate the technical efficiency of 
vessels due to the lack of stock estimates, which have been ignored in the previously 
published studies on Vietnam’s fisheries. For future work, the subsidy policies should be 
reviewed and assessed at national levels. A proper analysis framework for assessing the 
effects of fisheries subsidies, including consistent methodologies, should be developed for the 
SCS fisheries. This review and assessment should address the economic, environmental and 
social outcomes, potential trade-offs and cost-effectiveness, as well as taking into account the 























PART 1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1. Background, research problems and objectives 
In fisheries economics, it is generally accepted that commercial fishers are profit-seekers. The 
existence of any positive economic profit will thus attract new entrants. For an open-access 
fishery in which the property rights of fish resources are not defined, the potential resource 
rent is wasted and dissipated (Clark, 1990; Gordon, 1954). This is described as a consequence 
of the “tragedy of the commons” introduced by Hardin (1968). However, a producer’s 
surplus, called intra-marginal rent in fisheries, may exist even under open-access equilibrium 
(Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Copes, 1972; Flaaten, 2016). Therefore, it may be appropriate to 
determine first whether an open-access fishery creates any net benefits, such as intra-
marginal rent. It is thus important to examine the economic dimension to address this issue. 
In other words, this dissertation emphasizes the economic analysis of an open-access fishery. 
The empirical focus of this dissertation is on Vietnamese offshore fisheries in the East 
Sea, internationally known as the SCS, which are fished competitively by vessels from more 
than 10 countries. Vietnam has a coastline of about 3,260 km and its exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) extends over more than 1 million square kilometres (FAO, 2005b). Vietnam’s 
marine capture fisheries are characterized by open access (UNEP et al., 2009) and are 
generally referred to as small scale since a large number of small vessels equipped with 
engines of less than 90 horsepower (HP) operate in its coastal waters (Pomeroy et al., 2009). 
These have resulted in increasing pressure on already-overfished near-shore resources (FAO, 
2005b). To reduce this pressure, since 1997, the Vietnamese Government has made strenuous 
efforts to develop its offshore fishing industry (FAO, 2005b; UNEP et al., 2009). In 1997, 
Vietnam introduced an investment programme for offshore vessels, and in 2008, it introduced 
fuel cost compensation subsidies, along with another subsidy programme in 2010. As a result, 
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Vietnam’s offshore fishing industry has been characterized as an open-access fishery 
subsidized by the Government’s financial transfers or support in recent years.  
In principle, fisheries subsidies have an impact on the profits of fishing vessels by 
either increasing their revenues or reducing their costs (Flaaten and Wallis, 2001; OECD, 
2006; Schrank, 2003; Sumaila, 2013; von Moltke, 2011; Westlund, 2004). It is thus important 
to ask whether, and to what extent, the revenues are enhanced or the costs lowered by the 
subsidies. Therefore, this dissertation mainly focuses on evaluating the economic effects of 
the Government’s subsidy programmes for Vietnam’s offshore fisheries. This implies that it 
analyses the impacts of subsidies on key aspects of the economic dimension, that is, the 
economic performance and efficiency of offshore fishing vessels. This issue is addressed 
through the following questions:  
i. What is the economic performance of offshore fishing vessels? (Papers 1, 2 and 3) 
ii. What is the technical efficiency of offshore fishing vessels? (Paper 4) 
iii. Which vessels earn intra-marginal rent? (Papers 1, 2 and 3) 
iv. Which vessels are economically more efficient than others? (Paper 1) 
v. What is the income of crewmembers? (Papers 1, 2 and 3) 
vi. How do subsidies affect the economic profitability of vessels? (Papers 1, 2 and 3) 
The subsidies of offshore fishing vessels are investigated and quantified, mainly 
through representative costs and earnings surveys; then, the study examines the effect of 
these subsidies on the economic profitability of the vessels. Economic performance indicators 
are used to evaluate the vessel profitability and to investigate whether intra-marginal rent 
exists in the investigated fleets. The effects of the Government subsidies are analysed by a 
static comparison of the economic performance of vessels including and excluding subsidies 
(Papers 1 and 2). Following the analysis principles introduced by Westlund (2004), this is 
referred to as an assessment that constitutes a snapshot of the current situation. However, it is 
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appropriate to ask what would have happened to the vessel profitability if a subsidy 
programme had not been implemented. To deal properly with this research problem, the 
dissertation undertakes evaluations by comparing the profitability when the Government’s 
subsidy action takes place with that without this action (Paper 3).  
By answering the research questions, the distributional impacts of the subsidies are 
also explored. What is the effect on rent generation and distribution? Who is affected more 
and who less by the subsidies? Since the subsidies will have a certain impact on the 
distribution of incomes (Munro and Sumaila, 2002), identifying those beneficiaries who are 
affected by a subsidy is an important step in determining the likely effects of a subsidy and 
the effectiveness of a subsidy programme (OECD, 2006). The aspect of human well-being 
(the social dimension of the subsidies) is thus addressed within the aspect of income 
distribution (Papers 1, 2 and 3).  
The effects of subsidies on resources will depend on the state of the fish stocks, as 
well as on the type of the fisheries management regimes (OECD, 2006; von Moltke, 2011). In 
open-access fisheries, in which entry to the fisheries is not restricted, the abnormal profit 
generated by subsidies will distort the economic incentives and encourage overinvestment in 
the fisheries, resulting in a negative impact on fisheries’ resources – an aspect of the 
environmental (ecological) dimension (OECD, 2006). The effects of subsidies on resources 
are probably from a long-term perspective. With the knowledge and information currently 
available, a proper analysis of the effects of subsidies on resources is difficult to conduct. 
Nevertheless, the dissertation attempts to estimate fish stock proxy indices and to provide 
reasonable discussions on the status of fisheries’ resources (Paper 4).   
It can be seen that although the key focus of the research is on the economic effects of 
subsidies, the ecological and social dimensions are taken into account. This means that the 
dissertation adopts a sustainable development perspective for assessing the effects of the 
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Government subsidies. It is generally accepted that subsidies in open-access fisheries can be 
considered unsustainable, especially in economic and resource terms (OECD, 2006; Sumaila, 
2013; von Moltke, 2011). However, based on the dimensions of a sustainable development 
framework, the dissertation attempts to provide an insight into the extent to which open-
access fisheries are affected by the Government subsidy programmes. 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Section 2 provides 
background information on the SCS fisheries, followed by information on Vietnam’s offshore 
fisheries and subsidy programmes in Section 3. Section 4 gives a brief overview of the 
concepts of subsidy and sustainable development. Section 5 explains the theoretical 
frameworks used in the papers, followed by the methodology in Section 6 and the data in 
Section 7. Section 8 focuses on the research results. This section describes the connection 
between the four papers. The main achievements, concluding remarks and future works are 
summarized in Section 9. Finally, the four papers are presented in detail in Part 2. 
 
2. The fisheries in the South China Sea 
“The South China Sea” refers to a semi-enclosed sea that is part of the Pacific Ocean and is 
located in Southeast Asia. It encompasses an area of around 3.5 million km2 (Pauly and 
Christensen, 1993). It is formed from the marine, coastal and hinterland river catchments of 
ten nations: China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, 
the Philippines and Taiwan. The SCS is also recognized as a large marine ecosystem (LME), 
excluding the Gulf of Thailand, with specific characteristics of oceanography, biogeography 
and ecology (Sherman and Hempel, 2009). The SCS LME covers an area of 3.1 million km2 
and contains 7.27% and 0.93% of the world’s coral reefs and seamounts, respectively (Pauly 
and Zeller, 2015).  
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The SCS region is described as the global centre of biodiversity for marine species 
with a tropical climate (Pauly and Christensen, 1993; UNEP, 2005b). The region provides 
some of the world’s most diverse sea grass beds and mangrove forests, as well as more than 
2,500 species of marine fishes and 500 species of reef-building corals (UNEP, 2005b). It is 
considered to be a moderate-productivity ecosystem (150–300 mgCm-2day-1) (Sherman and 
Hempel, 2009, p.297). More details on the ecosystems in the SCS can be found in the 
documents of Pauly and Christensen (1993) and the UNEP (2005b). 
The fisheries in the SCS are of great local, national and international importance 
(UNEP, 2005b). The marine fisheries are a major contributor to the food security and 
economy of the bordering countries. The reported landings from the SCS have increased from 
0.6 million tonnes in 1950 to over 8.6 million tonnes in 2010 (Pauly and Zeller, 2015). 
Illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing is also a characteristic of this region 
(UNEP, 2005b). The unreported landings are estimated to have been almost half (4.2 million 
tonnes) of the reported landings in 2010 (Pauly and Zeller, 2015). 
The total catch production (both the reported and the unreported landings) in the SCS 
increased significantly during the period from 1950 to 2003, dramatically decreased in the 
period from 2003 to 2008 and rose slightly again in the years 2008 to 2010 (see Figure 1). 
China, Thailand and Vietnam have the greatest fishing volumes (Figure 1), with landings of 










Figure 1. Total landings by fishing country in the South China Sea LME. 
Source: Pauly and Zeller (2015), available from 
http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/lme/36?chart=catch-
chart&dimension=country&measure=tonnage&limit=10 (cited 14 November 2015). 
 
 
Figure 2. Catches by functional groups in the South China Sea LME. 
Source: Pauly and Zeller (2015), available from 
http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/lme/36?chart=catch-




The targeted groups for harvesting in the SCS include tuna, mackerel, scad, flying 
fish, billfish and sharks for the pelagic species along with a large array of demersal fish and 
invertebrates, especially penaeid shrimps (Sherman and Hempel, 2009). Small demersals (< 
30 cm) and medium pelagics (30–89 cm) both accounted for the largest amounts, almost half 
of the total landings, in the years 1950–2010 (Figure 2). In 2010, the catches of these two 
functional groups were around 2.2 million tonnes each (Pauly and Zeller, 2015). The most 
economically important species being exploited from the SCS’s pelagic fish stocks as well as 
from demersal and high-sea resources include, among others, tuna, mackerel, round scad, 
anchovies and sardines (SEAFDEC, 2012, 2013). The catches of pelagic fish species are 
estimated to be about 3.9 million tonnes (accounting for 45.3% of the total landings) in 2010 
(Pauly and Zeller, 2015). These highly migratory fish species are generally recognized as 
migrating across the EEZs of more than one country and international waters and thus are 
also known as shared stocks (Ablan and Garces, 2005).  
However, the majority of the catches are supplied by overexploited and exploited 
stocks (Figure 3a). Meanwhile, the stock–catch status plots indicate that about 40.9% of the 
stocks in the SCS LME are overexploited or collapsed (Figure 3b). The primary driving force 
of biomass change in this region comes from intensive fishing (Sherman and Hempel, 2009). 
The SCS is characterized by overexploitation and overcapacity due to increasing fishing 
effort over the years (Ablan and Garces, 2005; UNEP, 2005b). As a result, there are 
indications of overfishing in the SCS (Pauly and Zeller, 2015; Sherman and Hempel, 2009). 
The UNEP’s (2006) assessment of the SCS highlights the range and severity of the 
socioeconomic effects of overfishing. Throughout the region, reduced economic returns and 
loss of income and employment as well as of livelihoods have resulted from the fisheries’ 





Figure 3. Stock–catch status plots for the South China Sea LME. 
Notes: (a) The percentage of catches from stocks of a given status and (b) the percentage of 
stocks of a given status. The stock status plots assess the status of stocks by catch biomass (3-
year running average values; panel (a)) and by the number of stocks (panel (b)) from 1950 to 
2010. The stock–status categories are defined using the following criteria (all referring to the 
maximum catch [peak catch] or post-peak minimum in each series): developing (catches ≤ 
50% of the peak and the year is pre-peak or the year of the peak is the final year of the time 
series); exploited (catches ≥ 50% of the peak catches); overexploited (catches between 50% 
and 10% of the peak and the year is post-peak); collapsed (catches < 10% of the peak and the 
year is post-peak); and rebuilding (catches between 10% and 50% of the peak and the year is 
after the post-peak minimum). The number of stocks (n) is defined as a time series of a given 
species, genus or family (higher and pooled groups have been excluded) for which the first 
and last reported landings are at least 10 years apart, for which there are at least 5 years of 
consecutive catches and for which the catch in a given area is at least 1000 tonnes. Source: 
Pauly and Zeller (2015), available from http://www.seaaroundus.org/data/#/lme/36/stock-




The SCS is one of the world’s most contentious areas in relation to international 
waters, with significant territorial disputes among neighbouring countries (UNEP, 2005b). 
There have been significant territorial disputes between China and Vietnam over the 
sovereignty of the Paracel Islands (which have been occupied by China instead of Vietnam 
since 1974; Thao, 2001) and among China and Taiwan and their Southeast Asia neighbours 
over the sovereignty of the Spratly Islands and other offshore resources (UNEP, 2005b). A 
review of the disputes in the SCS was documented by Long (2009), particularly relating to 
access to fisheries.  
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), with the 
provision that all littoral countries can demand an EEZ of 200 nautical miles measured from 
the coastline, led to increased tensions in the SCS (Ablan and Garces, 2005; Han, 2007; 
Thao, 2001; UNEP, 2005b). The governments of the countries bordering the SCS publicly 
exhort their fishermen to fish in disputed waters (UNEP, 2006). Consequently, the 
establishment of EEZs has contributed to overexploitation and overcapacity of the fisheries in 
this region (Ablan and Garces, 2005; UNEP, 2005b). The governments have encouraged the 
development of the national fishing capacity and the use of advanced fishing technology to 
promote the development. They have provided subsidies to fisheries for social, economic and 
cultural reasons. An estimation of the fisheries subsidies of the countries bordering the SCS 
can be found in Sumaila and Pauly (2006). The governments have also encouraged fishing 
offshore and fishing agreements with other countries, which in several cases has created 
excess capacity (Ablan and Garces, 2005). All these factors have increased the fishing effort 
on fish stocks.  
In addition, the SCS fisheries are generally considered to be open access as most 
countries on the margins of this sea region have very limited resources to monitor and control 
effectively the area bounded by their EEZs (Ablan and Garces, 2005). A transboundary 
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diagnostic analysis conducted by Talaue-McManus (2000) identified loss of fisheries’ 
productivity in the international waters of the SCS region as a key transboundary issue. 
Oceanic migratory species, such as tuna, billfish, sharks and other pelagic species, are 
overexploited, with potential transboundary effects (Sherman and Hempel, 2009; UNEP, 
2005b). A regional management plan for the maintenance of transboundary fish stocks in the 
SCS region has been promoted. However, many transboundary issues remain unresolved due 
to the aftermath of regional conflicts, colonial heritage and international political affiliations 
(UNEP, 2005b). Therefore, the countries bordering the SCS have been facing problems 
regarding the socioeconomic impacts of unsustainable exploitation of fisheries and 
environmental deterioration, including the effect of subsidy policies (Ablan and Garces, 
2005; Sherman and Hempel, 2009; UNEP, 2005b, 2006).  
 
3. Marine capture fisheries and subsidies in Vietnam 
3.1. Overview of marine capture fisheries in Vietnam 
Vietnam’s marine capture fisheries have started developing since the economic reforms of 
“Doi Moi” in 1986. However, after the U.S. lifted the embargo for Vietnam in 1994, its 
marine capture fisheries developed significantly, for exports as well, as the Vietnamese 
Government recognized the opportunities for Vietnam to invest in the fisheries sector for 
socioeconomic development. Subsidies were used to develop its marine capture fisheries, 
especially offshore fisheries. 
Vietnam’s coast has many bays and estuaries as well as diverse coastal and marine 
resources; thus, its EEZ contains an abundant number of species (FAO, 2005b). According to 
a recent evaluation, the potential of the marine fisheries’ resources has been estimated to be 
5.075 million tonnes, of which small pelagic fish account for 54% and demersal fish and 
oceanographic pelagic fish each occupy about 23% (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012a). The 
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annual sustainable catch is 2.147 million tonnes, including 1.1 million tonnes of small pelagic 
species, 0.587 million tonnes of demersal fish and 0.462 tonnes of oceanographic pelagic 
fish. These have created good potential for the development of mainly multi-species marine 
capture fisheries as well as marine aquaculture. The fisheries sector, including marine capture 
fisheries, has become an important sector in the national economy, contributing nearly 4% to 
the gross domestic product (FAO, 2005a, 2005b; World Bank, 2005). The marine capture 
fisheries provide direct employment for 750,000 fishers, with annual average growth of about 
50,000 people during the period 2001–2011 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012a). 
Vietnam’s marine fisheries are open access as participants are free to enter and the 
few regulations are almost unenforced (FAO, 2005a; UNEP et al., 2009). The number of 
mechanized fishing vessels has increased by about 5.2% per annum, from 71,495 units in 
2001 to about 130,000 units in 2012 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012a, 2012b). The average 
engine capacity of the vessels has increased from below 3.5 million HP in 2001 to over 7 
million HP in 2012 – an average of 6.5% per year. Vessels with engine power of over 90 HP 
accounted for 1.4% in 1997 and around 8% in the years 2000–2002 (Directorate of Fisheries, 
2012b; FAO, 2005a, 2005b). This increased to over 20% in the years 2011–2014 and reached 
about 31,235 units by 2014 (GSO, 2014). This indicates that Vietnam’s marine capture 
fisheries are considered to be small scale as a large amount of vessels are equipped with a 
small engine size (i.e., less than 90 HP) and these vessels operate mainly in coastal sea areas.  
The Vietnamese fishing vessels are multi-gear. The most popular fishing gears are 
trawl, gillnet, longline/hand-line and purse seine. The structure of the vessels by fishing gear 
has changed over time. In 2001, the gillnet fleet accounted for the largest number of vessels, 
with 24.5%, followed by trawl (22.5%), longline/hand-line (19.7%) and purse seine (7.7%) 
(Directorate of Fisheries, 2012a). By 2010, this proportion had changed as follows: gillnet 
(accounting for 36.8%), trawl (17.6%), longline/hand-line (17.0%) and purse seine (4.8%). 
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Of the vessels equipped with engines smaller than 90 HP in 2010, the number of gillnet, 
longline/hand-line and trawl vessels accounted for the greatest amount, with 41.2%, 17.6% 
and 12.8%, respectively.  
Vietnam’s marine capture fishery production amounted to 1.481 million tonnes in 
2001 and 2.511 million tonnes in 2012 – an increase of 4.9% per year (GSO, 2005, 2014). 
The fishing productivity declined from 19.9 tonnes/vessel/year and 0.42 tonnes/HP/year in 
2001 to 17.3 tonnes/vessel/year and 0.34 tonnes/HP/year in 2010 (Directorate of Fisheries, 
2012a). It should be noted that catch landings from inshore waters accounted for 70% of the 
total marine catch in 2001 and this figure decreased to below 50% in the years 2010–2014.  
In recent years, Vietnam’s coastal resources have been considered to be overexploited 
and biologically overfished (FAO, 2005b; UNEP et al., 2009; World Bank, 2005). This has 
led to a serious effect on the economic, ecological and social aspects of Vietnam’s fisheries. 
The majority of coastal fishing communities are considered to be poor and their household 
income mainly depends on marine fishing (FAO, 2005a; Pomeroy et al., 2009). Most of them 
are regarded as having a low educational level. A total of 68% of fishers have not finished 
primary school; 20% have finished primary school and nearly 10% have finished secondary 
school; and fewer than 1% have a certificate or diploma from a vocational school or 
university (FAO, 2005b).  
 
3.2. Offshore fisheries in Vietnam 
Offshore fisheries have been strongly promoted by the Government since 1997, through the 
introduction of support programmes. This has encouraged the growth of underdeveloped 
offshore fisheries with the expansion of the fleets and an increase in the production 
(Directorate of Fisheries, 2012b; FAO, 2005b; UNEP et al., 2009). It should be noted that 
vessels with a capacity over 90 HP are classed as offshore fishing vessels and that offshore 
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fishing grounds are defined in the Decree (2010) for Vietnam’s fisheries context. The number 
of offshore vessels increased rapidly from 1,000 units in 1997 to 6,000 units in 2001 and 
28,000 units in 2012 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012b; FAO, 2005b; GSO, 2014). The 
proportion of offshore vessels in the total fishing vessels was about 25% in 2014 compared 
with 20% in 2012, 8% in 2001 and 1.4% in 1997. The engine capacity of the offshore fleet 
increased by 12.7% per year to reach almost 6 million HP by 2012 (GSO, 2005, 2014). The 
number of fishers participating directly in offshore fishing operations has increased over 
time, and was estimated to be 170,000 people in 2010 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012a).  
At present, the offshore fishing fleet consists of trawlers (up to 46.7% of the total 
number of offshore vessels), longline and hand-liners (14.0%), purse seiners (13.3%), 
gillnetters (10.0%) and others (16.0%) (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012a). The sea area of 
Vietnam is generally divided into four main regions, namely the Tonkin Gulf (northern), 
central, southeast and southwest. More than 60% of the offshore vessels operate in the central 
and southeastern regions. 
The offshore capture fisheries’ production was estimated to be about 0.456 million 
tonnes (up to 30.8% of the total capture fisheries’ production) in 2001 and increased to 1.1 
million tonnes (49.4%) in 2010 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012a). There is no single accurate 
measure for assessing the productivity of the offshore fleet in Vietnam. The most commonly 
used measure is the catch per vessel and per HP for mechanized vessels, which is inaccurate, 
particularly during a period of rapid mechanization and an increase in vessels and power. 
Nevertheless, based on calculations self-authored from the limited available data, the catch 
per unit of effort changed from 75.9 tonnes/vessel/year and 0.28 tonnes/HP/year in 2001 to 
41.6 tonnes/vessel/year and 0.24 tonnes/HP/year in 2010 (Directorate of Fisheries, 2012a; 
GSO, 2005, 2014). This is indicative of a decline in productivity in relation to a unit of effort. 
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It is generally known that poor enforcement of the law and legislation is commonly 
observed and that there is a poor response of fishers to regulations (FAO, 2005a; UNEP et al., 
2009). Although the total allowable catch is set for different sea areas, there is no quota 
system and the management regime is regarded as being open access to offshore resources in 
Vietnam. In 2013, Vietnam’s Prime Minister approved the master development plan for the 
fisheries sector to 2020 and the vision towards 2030 to create sustainable development for 
Vietnam’s fisheries (Decision, 2013). According to this plan, the number of fishing vessels 
will be reduced to 110,000 units in 2020, of which the offshore fleet will account for 28,000 
to 30,000 units. The total marine capture production is planned to be 2.2 million tonnes in 
2020, of which the offshore production will be about 1.4 million tonnes.   
Regarding the status of the offshore resources, one cannot say with certainty that there 
is biological overfishing in the Vietnamese offshore fisheries because of the absence of a 
robust and trustworthy maximum sustainable yield (MSY) estimate. Some signs indicate that 
the offshore fishing capacity and effort may be overinvested and that the offshore waters may 
be overexploited. At least, significant doubts have been raised concerning whether the 
offshore fish stocks are sufficient to support further expansion in the offshore capacity 
(DANIDA, 2010). First, the Vietnamese offshore fisheries are open-access fisheries that have 
been subsidized by government aid schemes. The growth in offshore fishing has, thus, been 
rapid in the aspects of both fishing capacity and production, and it is increasingly suspected 
that previously underfished offshore stocks have become overfished. Second, some signals 
suggestive of overfishing in offshore areas may be the increasing reports of offshore vessels 
fishing closer to shore and vessels straying into the waters of other territories. Boonstra and 
Bach Dang (2010) showed that more than half of the vessels with over 90 HP in the 
commune of Phuoc Hai in the southeast of Vietnam were found to be fishing in inshore areas. 
In addition, the reports of the UNEP (2005b, 2006) point out that the “common pool” nature 
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of fishery resources, excessive fishing effort and fleet capacity (which cause 
overexploitation), poor recruitment of fish stocks and inappropriate subsidies result in 
overfishing in the SCS region. Such trends may be indicative of overfishing in areas of 
Vietnam’s EEZs or of the stock approaching being biologically fully fished.  
 
3.3. Government subsidies for offshore fisheries 
The offshore fishing industry in Vietnam has been considered an underdeveloped industry. 
Therefore, fishing subsidies could be seen as a tool to implement an “infant-industry” 
strategy, in which government aid in the early stages results in rapid development of the 
industry. Temporary protection for such an infant industry is expected to help to modernize 
the fleet, acquire the fishing experience and skills needed to compete effectively with foreign 
vessels and overcome the short-term difficulties so that the industry may become self-
sustaining (Schrank, 2003). In addition, the Government may have considered that offshore 
fisheries have long-term (strategic) potential, which it wishes to foster and protect for future 
socioeconomic growth and development. This is additionally promoted by several 
exemptions on subsidies, for which developing countries (e.g., Vietnam) would be authorized 
to apply in the context of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) rules for fisheries 
subsidies (UNEP, 2005a; UNEP et al., 2009; WTO, 2007).1 An overview of the Government 
subsidies offered to the fisheries sector in Vietnam was presented by UNEP et al. (2009). The 
following provides more details of the key subsidies for Vietnamese offshore fisheries. 
                                                          
1 That is, a list of subsidies could be directly linked to public policy objectives specific to developing countries, 
such as support for food security, subsistence and small-scale fishing, and emergency actions (UNEP, 2005a; 
WTO, 2007). In the Vietnamese case, these exemptions fall into the category Special and Differential Treatment 
for Developing Countries. The UNEP et al. (2009) found that Vietnam’s subsidy policies on fuel and vessel 
building, upgrading and infrastructure have focused on solving short-term issues (and are not likely to remain in 
the long term). In the WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies, policies on fuel, credits for vessel building, 
infrastructure, tax, and vessel renewal and upgrading are still being debated, and these require further 
consideration (UNEP et al., 2009).  
16 
 
From 1997 up to and including 2001, the Vietnamese Government ran a national 
target programme for offshore fishing development, which provided capital credit for the 
construction of (powerful) offshore vessels at government-subsidized interest rates. The 
subsidized interest was about 50% lower than that of commercial banks (UNEP et al., 2009). 
The cost of this programme from 1997 to 2001 was estimated to have been in the region of 
1,300 billion Vietnamese dong (VND) (~94 million 2001 USD), with the construction of 
about 1,300 offshore vessels. The government programme aimed to achieve two broad policy 
objectives: first, to expand further the marine fish production for domestic consumption and 
for exporting; and second, to reduce the pressure on coastal resources (FAO, 2005b). Private 
capital may have been insufficient to permit vessel owners to make the indigenous offshore 
fishing industry efficiently competitive and to attain the two objectives above. It was thus 
expected that when this industry was built up to the point at which it was self-sufficient, the 
programme would be removed. However, the effectiveness of this programme was 
constrained. About 31% of the vessels produced under the programme operated at a loss 
(FAO, 2005b, p.5). A large number of the offshore vessels funded also performed poorly in 
economic terms and the repayment rates on the loans were very low. Even though the interest 
rate on loans was partially supported, the subsidized vessels experienced a high failure rate, 
and only about 10% of the 1,300 vessels funded met their scheduled repayments (World 
Bank, 2005, p.17). Ultimately, the 1997 subsidy programme was removed at the end of 2001. 
In 2008, the Government introduced a fuel cost support subsidy due to the strong oil 
price increase in 2007 (Decision, 2008a, 2008b).2 The UNEP et al. (2009) estimated the total 
cost of the fuel subsidy to have been in the region of 1,600 billion VND (~ 91 million 2008 
USD). While funds were also provided for vessels below 90 HP, this subsidy was marketed 
                                                          
2 Offshore vessels (90 HP or larger) were supported with 10 million VND per trip to a maximum of 3 trips per 
year. Vessels with an engine size from 40 HP to 90 HP could receive 6.5 million VND per trip, to a maximum 
of 4 trips per year, and others correspondingly 4 million VND per trip to a maximum of 5 trips per year. 
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as support for offshore fishing. During the time of high fuel prices, offshore vessel owners 
faced serious temporary difficulties and were in danger of ceasing operations. The 2008 
support was thus seen as a temporary measure to help owners to overcome these difficulties 
(UNEP et al., 2009). However, this subsidy scheme was abolished after one year because the 
actual crude oil price decline during 2008 eliminated the arguments for further support.  
In addition to the fuel cost subsidy, as regulated in Decision (2008a), in 2008 the 
government introduced support for building and buying new vessels as well as renewing 
machines for offshore fishing. There were two primary objectives of this support, namely (i) 
to support the building of new vessels with engines over 90 HP (70 million VND/year) and 
(ii) to support the renewal of machines to achieve more fuel-efficient vessels (10 million 
VND/year for vessels in the 40–90 HP range and 18 million VND/year for vessels over 90 
HP) (Decision, 2008a). The policy time frame was 3 years (2008–2010). At present, a very 
low take-up rate of the subsidy has been reported. 
The effects of the 2008 global economic crisis on the national economy in the 
following years, combined with increasingly difficult weather conditions and territorial 
disputes in the SCS, substantially influenced fishers’ offshore fishing performance. In 
addition, the policy was expected to meet the two main offshore fisheries’ goals in Vietnam’s 
fisheries development strategy towards 2020: (i) to create employment and enhance the 
income and living standards of fishing communities as well as to contribute to poverty 
alleviation; and (ii) to reduce risk at sea and enhance the competitive capacity with foreign 
fishing vessels to contribute to the protection of the sovereignty of the territorial waters and 
the national security of Vietnam (Decision, 2010b). 
In 2010, the Government of Vietnam introduced another subsidy programme for the 
offshore fishing industry (Circular, 2011; Decision, 2010a). This programme includes fuel 
cost support, insurance subsidies, loans at favourable interest rates and other subsidy schemes 
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and has been operating since 2011. The fuel cost support subsidies are based on the engine 
size of the vessels and all vessels can be supported to a maximum of 4 trips per year.3 This 
support appears as a quasi-lump sum subsidy per trip. The insurance subsidies cover 50% of 
the vessel insurance costs and 100% of the accident insurance costs for fishers. Other subsidy 
schemes include support for the purchase of long-range acoustic devices integrated with GPS 
and damage compensation.  
The required conditions for receiving the fuel cost support and insurance subsidies 
are: (1) offshore vessels (i.e. vessels with engines of total capacity of 90 HP or more) had 
gone through registration and registry for regular operation in offshore sea areas, (2) vessel 
owners must provide confirmation that they regularly operate in offshore waters, which must 
be approved by the specified authorities located in offshore island areas, (3) submitting an 
updated log-book to the local fisheries management department for each fishing trip, and (4) 
the vessel owners need to submit a valid and complete dossier with the relevant documents to 
the local fisheries management department (Circular, 2011). For subsidized loans, the owners 
are required to fulfill additional conditions from the bank, such as providing collateral. 
In 2014, the Government introduced a new subsidy programme for offshore fisheries 
(Decree, 2014), which replaced the 2010 subsidy programme. The implementation of this 
subsidy programme will exert an effect between August 2014 and December 2016. The new 
subsidy scheme includes subsidized loans and loan guarantees for vessel construction and 
modernization (for offshore vessels with engines of over 400 HP), subsidized loans and loan 
guarantees for expenditure on variable costs, insurance subsidies for vessels and 
crewmembers, favourable tax policies (including natural resources tax) and other support 
policies. As Vietnam is a party to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement that could 
                                                          
3 Vessels with an engine size from 90 HP to 150 HP were supported with 18 million VND per trip, vessels with 
an engine size from 150 HP to 250 HP received 25 million VND per trip, vessels with an engine size from 250 
HP to 400 HP received 45 million VND per trip and vessels with an engine size of 400 HP or larger were 
supported with 60 million VND per trip. For 2008, see footnote 2. 
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potentially come into effect by late 2018 or early 2019, according to Article 20.16 (Marine 
Capture Fisheries) of this Agreement, it shall seek to operate a fisheries management system 
that is designed to prevent overfishing and overcapacity and to promote the recovery of 
overfished stocks for all marine fisheries (TPP Agreement, 2015). The implementation of 
such a fisheries management system must include the control, reduction and eventual 
elimination of all subsidies that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. Therefore, the 
Government subsidy programmes will be brought into conformity with the TPP Agreement 
no later than 5 years (included an extension of 2 additional years) from the date of entry into 
force of this Agreement for Vietnam (TPP Agreement, 2015).4  
 
3.4. Offshore fisheries in Khanh Hoa province 
The empirical analyses of this dissertation are applied to Khanh Hoa province’s offshore 
gillnet and hand-line fisheries operating in the SCS. Khanh Hoa is a coastal province in 
Southern Central Vietnam (see Figure 4), with a total land area of about 5,200 km2, a 
coastline of 520 km and more than 200 islands. Khanh Hoa’s fishing vessels numbered nearly 
10,000 unit in 2013, corresponding to a total engine capacity of about 0.5 million HP 
(DECAFIREP, 2013). The number of vessels and the total engine capacity increased by about 
6.1% and 13.5% between 2001 and 2013, respectively. The production of this fleet increased 
by an average of 3.2% per year in the same period (GSO, 2005, 2014). The total capture 
landings of the province were about 82,300 tonnes in 2013. There are about 38,200 people 
working in the fishing sector in Khanh Hoa province, with average growth of 3.9% per 
annum in the period 2007–2012 (DARD, 2014).   
 
                                                          
4 However, it is possible that inequalities and increasing disputes will appear among the countries bordering the 
SCS regarding the benefits from exploiting the SCS’s resources as some of them are not part of the TPP, for 




Figure 4. Khanh Hoa province, Vietnam. 
 
Out of the total fishing vessels in 2013, Khanh Hoa’s offshore fleet consisted of 
barely more than 1,000 units – accounting for about 10% of the total vessels (DECAFIREP, 
2013). The major offshore fishing gears are gillnet, longline/hand-line, trawl, set net and lift 
net. The gillnet and hand-line vessels make up about 25% and 15% of these offshore vessels 
(Figure 5), with an average capacity of 303 HP/unit and 283 HP/unit, respectively. These 
vessels are mainly found in the provincial capital, Nha Trang. Their number has increased 
over the years; vessels with an engine power over 400 HP increased significantly in the 
period 2009–2013 (Figure 5). The offshore fishery in Khanh Hoa has been open access since 
its inception and a minor resource tax was abolished in 2008. In addition, the offshore vessels 





Figure 5. The distribution of offshore vessels in Khanh Hoa province. 
Source: DECAFIREP (2013) 
 
The offshore fishing takes place all year round, from October to September of the 
following year, and is divided into two fishing seasons: the northeast monsoon (from October 
to March) and the southwest monsoon (from April to September). Offshore vessels often stay 
onshore for repairs and maintenance from either August to September or September to 
October. The target fish species of the gillnetters and hand-liners are migratory pelagic 
species (e.g., tuna species). The main target species in the gillnet fishery include striped tuna 
(Sarda orientalis), skipjack tuna (Katsuwonus pelamis) and mackerel species, such as the 
Indo-Pacific king mackerel (Scomberomorus guttatus), wahoo (Acanthocybium solandri) and 
narrow-barred Spanish mackerel (Scomberomorus commerson), as well as some other species 
caught as incidental bycatches. For the hand-line fishery, yellowfin tuna (Thunnus albacares) 
and bigeye tuna (Thunnus obesus) are the main target species caught, while a small amount of 
other species are referred to as bycatches. The fishing activities of the hand-line vessels are 
22 
 
conducted with light. Lamps are located along both sides of the vessel to attract squid, which 
are in turn used as bait. The hand-line gear uses a single hooked line attached to a bamboo 
pole to catch the fish. Gillnets consist of many individual net walls tied together to form 
a large net wall that hangs vertically in the water. Floats line the top of the net, while weights 
line the bottom of the net. When fish swim into the net, they are gilled, entangled or 
enmeshed by their gills. 
The actual fishing grounds depend on the direction of movement and the aggregation 
of these species. The fishing grounds are the offshore waters of the central sea region 
(11º30'N–14º00'N, 109º30'E–114º00'E) and the waters of the southeastern and southwestern 
areas, as well as high-sea waters (6º00'N–11º30'N, 105º00'E–114º00'N). In the northeast 
monsoon, tuna species are often found in the offshore sea areas of the central provinces from 
Phu Yen to Vung Tau and the central SCS (10º30'N–14º00'N, 110º00'E–114º00'E). The 
offshore vessels move to the southeastern waters and southwest of the Spratly Archipelago 
(6º00'N–10º30'N, 105º00'E–114º00'E) in the southwest monsoon. Tuna is also fished in the 
territorial waters of the provinces from Phu Yen to Binh Thuan, located at a distance of about 
50 to 100 nautical miles from the shore in this second season.  
 
4. Subsidy and sustainable development perspective  
4.1. Definition of subsidy 
According to Article 1 of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(WTO, 1999), a subsidy is defined as a financial contribution of a government that confers a 
benefit to firms or individuals. A financial contribution can involve a direct or potentially 
direct transfer of funds to the firm or individual (e.g., grants, loans, loan guarantees, equity 
infusions), foregone government revenue (e.g., tax waivers or exemption), government 
provision of goods and services other than infrastructure (at less than market prices) and 
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government support of prices and incomes (WTO, 1999, p.231). This definition of a subsidy 
is considered to be legally agreed internationally. In the Transition to Responsible Fisheries 
study conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
a government financial transfer is defined as “the monetary value of government 
interventions associated with fisheries policies” (OECD, 2000, p.129). Another study by the 
OECD (2006, pp.19–25) showed that the OECD definition of a government financial transfer 
covers subsidies as defined under the WTO as well as transfers related to management, 
research and enforcement, fisheries access agreements and fisheries-specific infrastructure. 
The definition of government financial transfers used in the document by the OECD (2000) 
includes market price support. The OECD (2006) study also showed that a broader definition 
of subsidy by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) expert consultations includes the 
lack of government intervention to internalize externalities, untaxed resource rents and 
negative subsidies.  
It is generally well known that there have been political debates about using 
alternative definitions of support to the fisheries sector. In this dissertation, the terms 
“subsidy”, “government financial transfer”, “support” and “transfer” are used 
interchangeably. The subsidies used in this dissertation modify the returns received and the 
costs incurred by the sector participants, so their profits are modified. This modification 
motivates them to alter their behaviour in fishing. This dissertation does not attempt to 
discuss subsidies involving either an increase in the market prices of fish caught or a 
reduction in the market prices of inputs employed in fishing operations.    
 
4.2. Subsidies from a sustainable development perspective 
Since the report by Brundtland et al. (1987) introduced the concept of sustainable 
development, fisheries economists and researchers have highly quoted this concept in 
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assessing the effects of policy decisions (OECD, 2006). Brundtland et al. (1987, p.54) stated 
that “sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. The concept is 
enshrined in the concern that policies should address the economic, environmental and social 
dimensions of sustainable development. The fisheries sector is considered as a prime 
illustration of this concept in analysing the effects of policy interventions (OECD, 2006). 
Effort has been devoted to analysing the effects of subsidies on economic and 
environmental sustainability (Flaaten and Wallis, 2001; Heymans et al., 2011; Munro and 
Sumaila, 2002; Sumaila et al., 2008). It is also known in the fisheries economics literature 
that there is a strong connection between fisheries management, sustainable development and 
the way in which subsidies serve to meet the sustainability goals (Clark et al., 2005; von 
Moltke, 2011). Such a study focuses greatly on the economic and environmental dimensions 
of sustainable development. 
Based on the sustainable development concept, the OECD (2006) emphasized the 
linkages and interactions between the three dimensions of sustainability, as illustrated in 
Figure 6. As a subsidy policy is often referred to as an economic policy tool designed to 
change the prices faced by agents in the fisheries sector or to change the relative wealth of the 
participants, the implementation of such a policy will influence the economic dimension first. 
The economic effects will then flow through to the effects on the environmental and social 
dimensions, which will in turn generate dynamic feedback effects amongst the three 
dimensions. The interaction between the economic and the environmental dimension includes 
the effects on the fish stocks and ecosystem. Depending on the effectiveness of the 
management measures in place, the status of the resource stocks affects the economic 
dimension in return. The interactions between the economic and the social dimension include, 
on one side, the impacts of the subsidy policies on the distribution of benefits and income, on 
25 
 
the skills, incentives and structures in the labour market and on the individual and community 
resilience. On the other side, subsidy programmes can affect the provision of human inputs 
into the fisheries sector in the form of labour, skills, knowledge and creativity. Policy 
intervention may lead to impacts of social norms, attitudes and institutions on the functioning 
of markets as well as on the need for the enforcement of regulations. The interactions 
between the environmental and the social dimension are dependent on the impacts of 
subsidies on the economic dimension (for example, from the economic to the environmental 
to the social dimension and from the economic to the social to the environmental dimension) 
(OECD, 2006). 
 
Figure 6. Interaction between the economic, environmental and social dimensions of 
sustainable development. 
Source: Adapted from the OECD (2006). 
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The linkages between the dimensions also involve unavoidable conflicts or trade-offs 
in the short term. Therefore, sustainable development stresses the long-term compatibility of 
the economic, environmental and social dimensions of human well-being. It is at the 
interfaces between the three dimensions that the concept of sustainable development is most 
relevant to policy (OECD, 2006).  
The OECD (2006) study argued that sustainable development is probably obtained in 
a well-managed fishery. However, it is well known in the fisheries economics literature that 
subsidies in open-access fisheries do not achieve the goals of sustainable development 
(OECD, 2006; Schrank, 2003; Sumaila, 2013; von Moltke, 2011). It is obvious that capacity-
enhancing subsidies under open-access schemes have negative effects on economic and 
environmental sustainability. In open-access fisheries, subsidies that improve the profitability 
will lead to overcapitalization and overexploitation (Munro and Sumaila, 2002).  
Overexploitation of resource stocks tends to be associated with economic losses and 
reductions of the well-being of the individuals and human communities reliant on the fishery. 
Therefore, this dissertation considers the extent to which the Government subsidy 
programmes affect the investigated fisheries under the open-access condition in relation to 
the aspects mentioned previously. It should also be noted that subsidy programmes are likely 
to be social and political policy tools of the Government and to play a central role in other 
social/political objectives. For example, subsidy programmes are linked to the need to 
maintain employment in the fishery, prevent the collapse of fishing communities, develop 
infant fishing industries, develop and support regional communities, maintain cultural and 




5. Theory of fisheries economics 
This dissertation integrates the theoretical frameworks of bioeconomics and vessel economics 
of fisheries and empirical investigations to examine the research problems. In particular, 
these theoretical frameworks act as bases for the empirical applications of the first three 
papers. First, these aim to illustrate in terms of theoretical analysis whether any net benefits 
exist for an open-access fishery. In the presence of subsidies, the bioeconomic theory can 
explain the effects of subsidy policies and the interactions between the economic and 
environmental dimensions. The vessel economics theory describes the impacts of subsidies at 
the individual vessel level, that is, the effects on the distribution of benefits and income of 
individuals (the interactions between the economic and the social dimension). 
 
5.1. Bioeconomic model and the impacts of subsidies 
The traditional economic model of Gordon (1954) is extended to illustrate the existence of 
intra-marginal rent for an open-access fishery with heterogeneous vessels (Copes, 1972; 
Flaaten, 2016) and the static effects of subsidies on the fishery. Given competitive vessels 
with heterogeneous cost structures, the industry marginal cost is an increasing function of the 
fishing effort (Copes, 1972; Flaaten, 2016). Thus, the industry long-term total cost curve (TC) 
and total revenue curve (TR), with a constant price of the catch, are as shown in Figure 7a. 
The open-access bioeconomic equilibrium point is where the industry average revenue of 




Figure 7. Intra-marginal rent and impacts of revenue-enhancing lump sum subsidies under 
open access in the case of heterogeneous vessels. 
 
It is assumed that commercial fishers are profit-seekers. In an unregulated open-
access fishery, the existence of any positive economic profit will attract new entrants to the 
industry, resulting in a reduction of the industry average revenue of effort until it equals the 
industry marginal cost of effort (Flaaten, 2016; Gordon, 1954). Thus, there will be open-
29 
 
access equilibrium of the effort level, EOA (Figure 7). With this equilibrium effort, there is a 
welfare economic, also called a social surplus, for the fishery, which is called the intra-
marginal rent (Figure 7, the line segment R (panel a) or the area ACF (panel b)). The 
potential return to the resource (resource rent) is dissipated in this situation because of the 
excessive level of effort being applied to the stock (Flaaten, 2016; Gordon, 1954), but the 
intra-marginal rent is generated from the most cost-efficient vessels earning above-normal 
profits.5 Therefore, profits that are above normal for an average vessel would indicate the 
existence of intra-marginal rent for the open-access fishery with a heterogeneous fleet.  
The government subsidies’ effects on vessel profits, which are examined in the case 
study of Vietnam, can be divided into revenue-enhancing and cost-reducing subsidies 
(Flaaten and Wallis, 2001; Westlund, 2004). For the sake of theoretical illustration, the effect 
of revenue-enhancing subsidies is discussed in this section. The Government’s income 
support appears as quasi-lump sum subsidies per trip on a per vessel basis and is based on 
vessel engine sizes. We thus assume that the total government financial transfers (Ssub) are 
defined as an increasing function of the fishing effort (E), for example linear Ssub = sE, where 
s is the average subsidy per unit of effort. These subsidies increase the total revenue received 
at each level of vessel effort, resulting in a shift of the total revenue curve from TR to TRS 
(Figure 7a). This may have the short-term effect of creating an economic surplus for the 
existing fishers (signified by the line segment S) in an open-access fishery (Flaaten and 
Wallis, 2001), which then attracts new entrants to the fishery. Accordingly, the long-term 
effect of revenue-enhancing lump sum subsidies is that a new equilibrium effort (ESOA) in this 
case shifts further away from the level of the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) effort 
                                                          
5 The economic profits from exploiting natural resources consist of two components: resource rent and intra-
marginal rent. Resource rent is referred to as the return to the owner of the fisheries resource (Gordon, 1954) 
and represents the value of the input generated by the fish stock in the production process (Coglan and Pascoe, 
1999). Intra-marginal rent is generated by the factors of production owned by the fishers through more efficient 
vessels and practice (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999; Copes, 1972). Normal profits in this context are referred to as 
zero economic profits. Vessels earning normal profits are called marginal vessels. 
30 
 
(EMSY). This leads to a negative impact on the fish stocks. The stock size at the E
S
OA level is 
lower than that at the EOA level (see more in Flaaten and Wallis, 2001). 
At the new equilibrium effort ESOA, the business economic surplus (with subsidies) for 
the open-access fishery is indicated by the segment Rws (panel a) or the area BDF (panel b), 
of which the actual economic surplus (without subsidies) accruing from fishing operations is 
signified by the segment Ros. The value of Ros corresponds to the difference between the areas 
IEF and IJB in Figure 7b. It is clear that Ros < R. In other words, the welfare economic 
surplus for the fishery when the government’s subsidy action takes place is smaller than the 
surplus without this action. This welfare economic surplus may be positive, zero or negative, 
depending on the magnitude of the subsidies and the increasing level of effort and hence on 
the decreasing size of the resource stock. When the subsidy value is high, the social surplus 
for the fishery is likely to be dissipated. Intra-marginal vessels still exist due to the different 
cost structures of the vessels. 
The effects of cost-reducing subsidies can easily be derived from the use of a similar 
model to the revenue-enhancing subsidies. The industry cost curve TC(E) and the industry 
marginal cost curve MC(E) shift downward as an effect of a cost subsidy. The industry 
effects are similar to that which has been described above. The same applies to a subsidy per 
unit of landed fish – the TR(E) and AR(E) curves shift upward, increasing the equilibrium 
effort and reducing the stock level and the intra-marginal rent.  
 
5.2. Economic behaviour of fishing firms and the impacts of subsidies 
This subsection briefly describes the effects of revenue-enhancing lump sum subsidies on the 
vessel behaviour and on the distribution of benefits in an open-access fishery. Given that the 
industry is competitive and that individual vessels are not able to influence the market price 
of fish, all the vessels face the same marginal revenue (equivalent to the industry average 
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revenue) at a given point in time (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999).6 For the objective of profit 
maximization, an individual vessel’s profit is maximized at the level of effort at which its 
marginal cost (mc) equals its marginal revenue (mr).  
Figure 8b shows that, in the absence of subsidies, the open-access equilibrium effort 
level of the industry is at the EOA level (the intersection of the MC curve with the AR curve). 
During any time period (e.g., one year), some vessels are likely to earn economic profits 
(intra-marginal rent) while others make economic losses (extra-marginal rent) (Coglan and 
Pascoe, 1999). In Figure 8a, vessel 1 is earning economic profits (showed by the shaded area) 
with its profit-maximizing effort e1
OA, where mrOA = mc1, and vessel i is making normal 
profits with its fishing effort ei
OA, whereas vessel j is experiencing an economic loss. The 
vessels making economic losses after capital costs (i.e., vessel j) may operate in the short 
term if their marginal revenue of effort is more than the minimum average variable cost of 
effort, but in the long term, they will be forced to exit the fishery.  
The total subsidies are, as assumed, an increasing linear function of the fishing effort. 
The introduction of this subsidy policy will shift the fishery’s average revenue curve from AR 
to ARS in Figure 8b, given a constant price of fish. The new open-access equilibrium is at the 
point at which the level of effort is ESOA and the fishery’s average revenue, including the 
effort subsidy, is ARws. At this level of effort, the actual average revenue from fishing 
operations (excluding the subsidies), ARos, is equal to the ARws level minus the average 




                                                          
6 For the sake of illustration of the existence of intra-marginal vessels, the fishing vessels are assumed to be 






Figure 8. Heterogeneous fishing fleet in an open-access fishery with revenue-enhancing 
lump sum subsidies. 
Notes: mc is the marginal cost of the individual’s effort curves, and atc is the average total 
cost of the individual’s effort curves. 
 
When the fishery’s average revenue increases from AROA to ARws (Figure 8b), vessels 
will increase their individual fishing effort to maximize their profits. As illustrated in Figure 
8a, by receiving the subsidies, vessel 1 and vessel i increase their individual effort to the level 
e1
ws and the level ei




ws (where mrws = mcj) to obtain normal profits. Some formerly unprofitable vessels 
thus become profitable and the total effort expands. Even though the marginal revenue of 
effort is lower than the minimum average variable cost of the individual vessel effort, fishers 
may still operate in the short term, as long as they have a positive operating cash flow, 
including the subsidies. Similarly, even if vessels’ revenue (without the subsidies) is not able 
to cover all their costs, they may continue to operate in the long term, as long as they have 
positive economic profits including the subsidies. However, the rent generation and 
distribution and the effects of subsidies on the distribution of benefits and income differ 
among individual vessels. This is due to the different cost structures of fishing firms. Vessel 
1, with a lower cost structure, may receive more benefits than the others. 
The impacts of cost-reducing subsidies on vessel behaviour and equilibrium can be 
described in a similar way to those for revenue-enhancing effort subsidies. Because of the 
effect of an effort cost subsidy, the average cost of effort will be reduced. Since the 
Government’s cost support is based on vessel engine sizes, the cost structure obviously 
differs among vessels, resulting in a heterogeneous distribution of benefits and income.  
 
6. Methodology  
The dissertation uses economic performance indicators to evaluate vessel profitability and to 
examine whether intra-marginal rent exists in the investigated fleets. The economic 
performance of fisheries can be assessed from economic surveys of the vessels participating 
in the fishery (Coglan and Pascoe, 1999). From a fisheries management perspective with 
heterogeneous vessels, the level of economic rent (i.e., intra-marginal rent) accruing in an 
open-access fishery can be estimated from the economic profits of the vessels surveyed.  
The economic performance definitions used in this dissertation (Papers 1, 2 and 3) 
correspond in principle to those used in business economic analysis in general and in 
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previous profitability analyses of fishing vessels in industrialized countries (EC, 2004; 
Flaaten et al., 1995; Le Floc’h et al., 2008; Pascoe et al., 1996; Whitmarsh et al., 2000). The 
operating cash flow or gross cash flow is the main performance indicator, and it equals the 
concept of earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA). A positive operating 
cash flow indicates that the revenue exceeds the vessel owner’s operational and labour costs 
(Pascoe et al., 1996; Whitmarsh et al., 2000) and that intra-marginal rent may exist in the 
short term for the owners (Copes, 1972). Meanwhile, rent (i.e., intra-marginal rent) is an 
economic performance indicator that measures the efficiency of a producer from the society’s 
perspective. It is referred to as the economic rent to society of employing the owner’s capital 
in the fishing activity after subtracting all the expenses, including the opportunity cost of this 
capital (Whitmarsh et al., 2000). Since the revenue generated by the industry exceeds the real 
cost of the factors of production, the resultant positive rent implies that the fishery is efficient 
and profitable for society (Whitmarsh et al., 2000). If the rent is negative while the operating 
cash flow is positive, vessel owners may be commercially viable in the short term but not 
operating optimally, based upon a long-term analysis of the efficient allocation of the 
society’s resources (Pascoe et al., 1996; Whitmarsh et al., 2000).  
To analyse the effect of fisheries subsidies on the profits of vessels, Papers 1 and 2 
follow the costs and earnings analysis principles presented by Westlund (2004, pp.45–49). 
The subsidy values and earnings and costs survey data are organized into a format allowing 
the calculation of a profit and loss account with subsidies (representing the actual situation) 
and one in which the subsidies are removed. Therefore, these first two papers focus on an 
assessment that constitutes a snapshot of the current situation. According to the classification 
of Westlund (2004), the Vietnamese fuel cost subsidies can be classified as direct financial 
transfers, while loans on favourable terms and insurance schemes for vessel and fishers are 
referred to as services and indirect financial transfers. To analyse their impact on the profits, 
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it is important to know in precisely which way they influence the financial situation of the 
vessels and to provide information on which revenues and costs are affected (Westlund, 
2004). Therefore, the subsidies influencing the profits are divided into revenue-enhancing 
and cost-reducing subsidies. 
For Paper 1, the economic performance indicators are calculated for two cases: one 
including and one excluding the 2008 fuel subsidies, based on the 2008 costs and earnings 
data of offshore gillnet vessels. The 2008 Government fuel cost support appears as quasi-
lump sum subsidies per trip, payable directly to fishers for a limited number of trips per year. 
Fishers have to accept the market fuel price in their fishing operations; in reality, the fuel cost 
support is income support for fishers, although it may resemble an effort subsidy. Hence, this 
subsidy item is added to the gross revenue instead of subtracting it from the costs in this 
paper (as discussed above). 
To compare the economic efficiency of individual vessels, the fishing effort of the 
vessels is standardized. Standardized fishing effort indicators for the vessels are estimated 
using the production function approach. Adapting the definition of relative fishing power by 
Beverton and Holt (1957), the relative standardized fishing effort of each vessel is 
determined. Therefore, the ratio of the cost to the relative standardized effort reflects the cost 
efficiency and economic efficiency of the vessel. The relationship between cost efficiency 
and the relative standardized effort of each vessel is graphed using a Salter diagram, with the 
relative standardized effort along the horizontal axis and the average cost per unit of relative 
standardized effort on the vertical axis. For each vessel, the relative standardized fishing 
effort is measured by the width of the bar, whereas the height of the bar measures the cost per 
unit of effort. All the vessels are arranged from left to right according to their cost-efficiency 
levels, from the most cost-efficient to the least cost-efficient. 
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To apply this method properly, the fish stock level is assumed to be constant in the 
short term, so the catch per unit of effort (CPUE) is referred to independently from the 
vessel’s standardized effort. In addition, the fish price is considered to be the same for all 
vessels; the average revenue of a vessel’s standardized effort is thus similar among fishing 
vessels and equals the average revenue of the effort of the fishery. Hence, the economic 
efficiency of the vessel is referred to as the cost efficiency of the vessel’s effort. 
Heterogeneous vessels with different cost structures are thus different with respect to cost 
efficiency, resulting in the generation of differences in rent under unregulated open-access 
conditions – in the short as well as in the long run. 
In Paper 2, the economic performance indicators are used to evaluate vessel 
profitability. The effects of the government subsidies are analysed by a static comparison of 
the economic performance of vessels, including and excluding subsidies. Thus, the paper 
presents the costs and earnings findings, with and without subsidies, based on 2011 and 2012 
data of two offshore fleets: gillnet and hand-line vessels. The 2010 government fuel cost 
subsidies also appear as quasi-lump sum subsidies per trip, payable directly to fishers for a 
limited number of trips per year. Similarly to Paper 1, Paper 2 refers to this subsidy item as a 
revenue-enhancing subsidy. Support for vessel insurance costs and accident insurance costs 
for fishers and loans at subsidized interest rates are defined as cost-reducing subsidies. These 
two insurance cost items are components of the fixed operating costs. The interest payment 
on loans is estimated using the subsidized interest rate for the subsidy case and the 
commercial interest rate for the non-subsidy case. 
For Paper 3, the average treatment effects based on the propensity score-matching 
method are used to evaluate the vessel profitability when the Government’s subsidy action 
takes place and that without this action (i.e., counterfactual profitability). This method, 
developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), is applied to analyse the effects of the 2010 
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subsidy programme on the profitability of offshore gillnet vessels in two operating years, 
2011 and 2012. In this paper, vessels that received at least one of the subsidy types as those 
that participated in the 2010 subsidy programme are called subsidized vessels; hence, these 
vessels received a treatment. Vessels that did not receive any support types from the 
Government are considered to be non-participants in the programme and are referred to as 
non-subsidized vessels; thus, they belong to the control group. The method involves three 
stages. In the first stage, the propensity scores are estimated using a probit model in which the 
predicted probability of a vessel being subsidized is a function of variables. In the second 
stage, the vessels from the subsidized group are matched with those in the non-subsidized 
group based on their propensity scores. The sample is then tested to determine whether the 
subsidized and the non-subsidized vessels have the same characteristics. This means that the 
propensity scores estimated from the probit model need to satisfy the balancing property. In 
the final step, the treatment effects of the 2010 subsidy programme are obtained by 
comparing the means of the economic performance indicators across the two groups. 
The research objective of Paper 4 is to analyse three technical efficiency estimation 
methods with different fish stock proxy measures when using the stochastic production 
frontier (SPF) approach. The methods are applied to offshore gillnet and hand-line fisheries, 
based on 2011 and 2012 data. Because information on stock abundance is lacking, the three 
methods of fish stock proxy measures investigated in this paper are as follows:  
- Method 1: An index of stock abundance is derived based on changes in the average 
level of CPUE over time and this index is directly incorporated into the production 
frontiers as an explanatory variable. Using this method, an implicit assumption is 
made about the unitary elasticity of fish stock and effort. 
- Method 2: Instead of applying the CPUE index as an explanatory variable per se, it 
is used to adjust the output measure to allow the effects of stock change on output 
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to be incorporated into the analysis. The assumption tested is constant returns to 
effort. 
- Method 3: The dependent variable (catch) is adjusted using a composite stock effect 
index, which is referred to as the technical change component of the Malmquist 
index (see Appendix). Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is used in configurations 
such that the within-period variations in efficiency are independent of the 
underlying stock and the between-period differences in efficiency are, thereby, 
assumed to be directly proportional to the changes in stock abundance. This method 
is developed by Pascoe and Herrero (2004). To estimate the composite stock effect 
index, three steps of analysis with two output-oriented DEA models are proposed. 
The first DEA model with different outputs is used to estimate the TE of each 
vessel in each period. After that, the efficient levels of output of each vessel in each 
period are projected so that all the vessels are located on the frontier of each period. 
In the final step, the second DEA model is used to estimate the stock index by 
calculating the shift in the frontiers between the two periods, comparing the 
projected efficient output levels in period t ≠ s (e.g. year 2) with those in period s 
(e.g. year 1). 
 
7. Data 
This dissertation uses primary data of the surveyed samples of two offshore fleets in Khanh 
Hoa province of Vietnam – gillnet and hand-line – for three fishing year seasons – 
2008/2009, 2011/2012 and 2012/2013 (termed the 2008, 2011 and 2012 seasons, 
respectively). Following Long et al. (2008), the questionnaire was adjusted and the data of 
each fishery were collected with the same questionnaire for these year-seasons. While the 
data on the gillnet fishery were collected in three years, 2008, 2011 and 2012, the hand-line 
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fishery was surveyed for two years, 2011 and 2012. As mentioned previously, Paper 1 uses 
the 2008 data on the gillnet vessels, while Papers 2 and 4 apply the 2011 and 2012 data on 
both fisheries and the data of the three fishing year-seasons in the gillnet fishery are used in 
Paper 3. 
The data consist of detailed information on various aspects of the two offshore 
fisheries, such as vessels’ technical and operational characteristics, costs and earnings data, 
catch information (only for 2011 and 2012) and demographic data and crewmembers’ 
income. These data were collected through direct face-to-face interviews with fishing 
households, which were represented by the vessel owner and/or his wife. The 2008 data were 
obtained from 58 fishing households (25.8% of the population) involved in offshore gillnet 
fisheries. The data for 2011 and 2012 constituted a balanced panel of 57 gillnetters and 39 
hand-liners, which comprised about 22.1% and 25.5% of the gillnet and hand-line population, 
respectively. These surveyed samples are representative samples of Khanh Hoa’s offshore 
gillnet and hand-line population based on the samples’ representativeness test.  
While the surveys for 2008 were administered between August and November 2009, 
for 2011 and 2012 they were undertaken between September 2013 and February 2014. To the 
best of our knowledge, official government institutions do not regularly collect costs and 
earnings data for the evaluation of the economic performance and efficiency of fishing 
vessels, despite the stated need to do so. Some independent research papers have been 
published in recent years for the Khanh Hoa fisheries (Khanh Ngoc et al., 2009; Long et al., 
2008; Thuy et al., 2013) and for the Da Nang fisheries (Pham et al., 2014). These papers use 
the survey data (recall data) for their costs and earnings analysis and provide reasonably 
consistent results. Because in general it is difficult for fishermen, and their wives, to 
memorize and provide information on the different fishing trips carried out in the operation 
years, the average trip data of the costs and earnings each year were requested in the 
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questionnaire, as in the quoted studies. A few observations of missing and obviously 
unreliable information in the questionnaires were corrected by revisiting the fishing 
households, almost without exception producing a good final result. Hence, the data set is 
considered to be reliable for analyses of various aspects of the Khanh Hoa offshore fleets, 
including costs and earnings. 
In addition to the information on the offshore fisheries investigated, price data are 
collected from traders who buy fish directly from fishers. The dissertation also uses 
secondary data from published studies and organizational reports. These data provide helpful 
information for empirical discussions as well as comparison. 
 
8. Research results: a summary of the papers  
Paper 1 investigates the economic efficiency and performance of vessels in the open-access 
gillnet fishery and shows that an average gillnetter in 2008 earned a positive gross profit 
margin and profit margin, even when the quasi-lump sum fuel subsidies are excluded. This is 
close to what was expected based on the discussion of the theory of open-access fisheries. 
However, the average gillnet vessel would not have been able to meet all the calculated 
interest on the owner’s capital as well. Even so, the economic analysis demonstrates that 
some vessels made good earnings. These are the intra-marginal vessels in the heterogeneous 
fleet. This could imply that even in equilibrium in an open-access fishery with heterogeneous 
vessels, some of them may improve their economic performance by the introduction of cost-
saving practices. Hence, it is important to note that even in open-access fisheries many 
vessels may create net benefits to society, as demonstrated in this paper. 
Paper 1 demonstrates that the introduction of the 2008 fuel cost support had a positive 
effect on the profitability of the surveyed gillnet vessels. It also reveals that the engine HP 
effect, the amount of gear and the days of operation are the factors that produce the best 
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indicators of vessel efficiency. The relative standardized effort was developed and estimated 
for the surveyed vessels. In addition, the paper discusses the distributional impacts of the 
2008 fuel subsidies. The most economically efficient vessels are mainly, but not only, those 
with high relative standardized effort. These vessels earned most of the intra-marginal rent 
generated. The 2008 subsidies generated relatively more benefits for small-scale vessels than 
for large-scale ones. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that, on an annual basis, the 
average crew income is almost the same as that for the workers with higher educational levels 
or technical/vocational training working in the most profitable registered enterprises in 
Khanh Hoa; on a monthly basis, it is even more. The large-scale vessels created a greater 
annual income for crewmembers.   
Paper 2, based on the surveys of offshore gillnetters and hand-liners in the years 2011 
and 2012, illustrates that the offshore fisheries could be profitable for the vessel owners in the 
short term, without being socially optimal in the long term. The empirical results indicate that 
the Government’s intervention by the use of subsidies led to a reduction in the actual 
surpluses of the two fisheries compared with no intervention. The crewmembers earned their 
opportunity cost of labour or above in the working years. Some vessels achieved good 
earnings in these two years of the profitability analysis even when excluding the subsidies, 
probably due to the introduction of cost-saving practices. Like Paper 1, this paper confirms 
that, even in open-access fisheries, some vessels in the heterogeneous fleets may create net 
benefits to society. 
This paper demonstrates that the 2010 Government subsidy schemes had positive 
effects on the profitability of the investigated vessels, with the quasi-lump sum fuel cost 
support having the greatest effect. Unlike the effect of the 2008 subsidy programme in Paper 
1, the 2010 subsidy schemes produced relatively more benefits for large vessels than for 
small ones. The largest vessels (i.e., engines with a high HP) received relatively more support 
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than the smaller ones and earned most of the super-profit as well as the intra-marginal rent 
generated. However, the higher subsidies for larger vessels did not help all of them to achieve 
a higher level of economic performance. This paper also discusses several arguments for the 
Vietnamese subsidy programme. The subsidies may come from infant-industry arguments, 
strategic rent-shifting incentives of neighbouring countries, social and geopolitical objectives 
and SCS border security reasons. 
Paper 3, evaluating the average treatment effects of the 2010 Government subsidy 
programme, also provides quantitative evidence that the 2010 subsidies had a positive effect 
on the vessel profitability. These arrangements resulted in increased operating cash flow, 
profit, rent, operating cash flow margin and profit margin. The increased profitability of the 
vessels is a result of both the revenue-enhancing and the cost-reducing subsidy schemes, that 
is, positive effects of the fuel cost support on the gross revenue, negative effects of insurance 
subsidies on the fixed operating costs and negative effects of capital cost subsidies on the 
interest payment on loans. However, Paper 3 does not show a rosy prospect for the 
investigated gillnet vessels. The empirical results demonstrate that the profits were eroded 
over the two years of the analysis. The average treatment effects on the vessel profitability 
decreased from 2011 to 2012, while the 2010 support schemes were unchanged over the two 
years. The counterfactual profitability pointed to a decrease in 2012. In addition, the average 
catches of the surveyed vessels declined when comparing 2012 with 2011. 
Furthermore, the effects of the 2010 subsidy programme on the distribution of 
benefits and income of vessels and crewmembers are explored in this paper. The subsidies 
had positive impacts on the operating cash flow of large vessels (i.e., engines of over 400 HP) 
but negative effects on their intra-marginal rent, while they had positive effects on the rent of 
the small vessels (i.e., engines of less than 400 HP). In addition, it is interesting that the 
Government subsidy programme seems to have generated benefits for the vessel owners 
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rather than for the crewmembers. Statistically insignificant effects of the subsidies on the 
average income per fisher are found in the empirical analysis. The income of crewmembers is 
based on the sharing rules of the actual fishing income; therefore, in the short run, the sharing 
rules are not affected by the subsidy arrangements. This paper also infers that the argument 
that subsidies prevent unemployment and the collapse of fishing communities in developing 
countries, as discussed in paper 2, is partially convincing only in the short term. The intention 
to increase the track records of the bordering countries through the use of subsidies, for a 
better future bargaining advantage, may be futile. If future track-record-based management 
systems are applied to the SCS’s EEZs, this will probably lead to the fuelling of an 
international fishing war among neighbouring countries. International negotiations and 
dispute settlement based on international law should be used to agree on an internationally 
recognized delineation of the SCS to avoid encouraging the presence of countries’ own 
vessels in these areas with the use of subsidies and therefore reduce the pressure on the 
offshore resources. 
Paper 4 follows the SPF approach to estimate the production frontiers and technical 
efficiency for offshore gillnet and hand-line vessels based on the 2011 and 2012 catch and 
effort data. Due to the lack of stock estimates, three efficiency estimation models with three 
different stock proxy measures are proposed for each fishery. Based on the consistency 
conditions of the efficiency estimates, the results show that the CPUE measures provide the 
same estimates of efficiency scores as the DEA measures. The CPUE measures are not 
subject to a distortion in the estimates of technical efficiency as the average characteristics of 
the vessels in the two years are similar. Based on tests of the assumption of unitary elasticity 
for effort, the results demonstrate that the use of the DEA index provides a more robust 
estimate of production frontiers and elasticities when information on the stock abundance is 
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lacking. This approach is free from production-related assumptions in its derivation. Hence, it 
cannot be subject to a distortion in the measures of production elasticities. 
Both the CPUE and the DEA stock proxy measures indicate a decrease in the stock 
abundances from 2011 to 2012. This also indicates that the fish resources in Vietnam’s 
offshore waters are most likely to be biologically overfished. Under the open-access scheme 
for the investigated fisheries, the subsidy programmes have motivated the fishers to engage in 
more intensive use of the existing vessels and the expansion of fishing effort and capacity 
through investment, possibly resulting in overfishing. Furthermore, Paper 4 reports that the 
average TE scores were about 0.63 for gillnetters and 0.79 for hand-liners in the three 
models. These results may indicate that there is short-term potential for catch expansion for 
both fleets without additional inputs. However, this potential probably disappears in the long 
term because of the effects of the catch on the already-overfished open-access stocks. 
 
9. Conclusions  
This dissertation focuses on analysing the business and welfare economic performance and 
on evaluating the economic effects of the Government’s subsidy programmes for Vietnam’s 
offshore fisheries operating in the SCS. It integrates the theoretical frameworks of 
bioeconomics and vessel economics of fisheries and empirical investigations to examine the 
research problems. It approaches a sustainable development perspective for assessing the 
effects of the Government subsidies. Hence, although the key focus of the research is on the 
economic effects of subsidies, the ecological and social dimensions are taken into account. 
The empirical analyses are applied to the offshore gillnet and hand-line fisheries in the Khanh 
Hoa province. The first result shows that open-access fisheries can create net benefits (i.e., 
intra-marginal rent) for society, which are derived from the cost saving of the efficient 
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vessels. Thuy (2013) reported the same finding that rent creation can be achieved in an open-
access regime.  
Regarding the effects on the economic dimension, the subsidy programmes had 
positive effects on vessel profitability in the years of the analysis (Papers 1, 2 and 3). 
However, the profits were eroded over the years (Papers 2 and 3). There has been a decrease 
in counterfactual profitability as well as the average treatment effects on vessel profitability. 
It is also indicated that the Government’s intervention with the use of subsidies led to a 
reduction of the actual surpluses of the investigated offshore fisheries compared with the 
situation with no intervention. Therefore, the offshore fisheries could be profitable for the 
vessel owners in the short term without being socially optimal in the long term.   
Concerning the ecological dimension, the estimate of the fish stock proxy indices 
shows that the fish resources in Vietnam’s offshore waters are most likely to be biologically 
overfished. The previously published studies and organizational reports, as presented in this 
dissertation, provide similar findings on the status of fisheries’ resources. The Government’s 
support for the fisheries managed by the open-access regime may have added to this problem.  
For the social dimension, the dissertation addressed the aspect of human well-being, 
particularly within the area of income and rent distribution. For the 2008 year-season, the 
most economically efficient vessels are mainly those with a high level of relative 
standardised effort, but not without exception. The majority of these vessels earned intra-
marginal rent, while the smallest vessels were the most dependent on the Government’s 2008 
quasi-lump sum fuel subsidy scheme. For the 2010 subsidy programme, the larger vessels 
(i.e., a higher engine) received relatively more support than the smaller ones and earned most 
of the super-profit as well as the intra-marginal rent generated. The 2010 subsidy schemes 
brought about relatively more benefits for large vessels than for small ones; the opposite 
applies to the 2008 arrangements. However, the bigger subsidies for larger vessels did not 
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help all of them to achieve a higher level of economic performance. The average treatment 
effect of the subsidies on the rent of the largest vessels (i.e., engines over 400 HP) was 
negative (i.e., in 2012). In addition, the majority of the large-scale vessels provided a greater 
annual income for crewmembers, although insignificant effects of the subsidy arrangements 
on the income for crewmembers were found. Furthermore, the Government subsidy 
programmes generated more benefits for the vessel owners than for the crewmembers. In 
fact, this is to be expected in a free labour market in which labour in fisheries earns 
opportunity costs, adjusted for risk, long working days, working away from home and other 
factors. This could affect the behaviour of crewmembers towards other forms of 
remuneration contracts or alternatives in the future if maintaining such a subsidy programme. 
It is clear that the Government subsidy intervention had a negative impact on the 
sustainable development of the offshore fisheries. The design of subsidy programmes such as 
the 2010 schemes aimed to provide incentives for fishermen to invest in large-scale offshore 
vessels with more powerful engines. Under the open-access scheme, which allows new effort 
to enter the fishery, the policy goal of improving the income and profitability of the offshore 
fisheries by the use of subsidies can be achieved only in the short term. In the long term, the 
environmental deterioration (i.e., a smaller stock size) will counter the effect of the subsidies 
on economic and social sustainability.  
This research offers policy recommendations. Firstly, it is important to note that both 
the efficient utilization of the input resources associated with fishery production and the 
effective management of marine resources are fundamental issues that should be addressed 
for the fisheries in Vietnam’s EEZs as well as in the SCS. To achieve the goals of sustainable 
development, it would be wise for Vietnam to seek to operate a fisheries management system 
that is designed to prevent overfishing and overcapacity and to promote the recovery of 
overfished stocks for offshore fisheries. It is also important for Vietnam to enhance its 
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offshore fishing programmes to reduce the pressure on already-overfished coastal resources 
through support that does not contribute to overfishing and overcapacity. This support may 
include training fishermen to adopt new technology, providing information about the fish 
stock, forecasting weather and rescue and life-saving activities in high seas as well as 
transfers related to management, research and enforcement. 
However, international negotiations and existing dispute settlements based on 
international law should be used first to reach an internationally recognized delineation of the 
SCS to avoid encouraging the presence of countries’ own vessels in this area by the use of 
subsidies. The second is to promote the establishment of an effectively cooperative fishing 
regime in the SCS region, where the bordering countries share the common benefits from 
fisheries resources (see Long, 2009 for an overview and concepts). The calls for sharing the 
total allowable catch among the involved countries should be considered (see Armstrong and 
Flaaten, 1991; Munro, 1979 for discussions). These can contribute to reducing the pressure 
on Vietnam’s offshore resources and to maintaining the transboundary fish stocks and 
therefore can approach the sustainable development of the offshore fisheries.   
Finally, the dissertation contributes to the further development of the methods for 
comparing the economic performance and efficiency of vessels by the standardization of 
fishing effort and the estimation of a Salter diagram (Paper 1). To the best of my knowledge, 
this method for comparing vessel efficiency has not been published previously. The 
dissertation extends the traditional economic model of Gordon to illustrate the existence of 
intra-marginal rent for an open-access fishery with heterogeneous vessels and to model the 
static effects of revenue-enhancing lump sum subsidies on the fishery and individual vessels 
(Papers 2 and 3). It provides the first contribution to the literature regarding the treatment 
effect evaluation of a subsidy programme on a Southeast Asian fishery (Paper 3). It also uses 
different fish stock measures to estimate the technical efficiency of vessels due to the lack of 
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stock estimates, which have been ignored in the previously published studies on Vietnam’s 
fisheries (Paper 4). In future, the subsidy polices should be reviewed and assessed at national 
levels. This should be performed for all bordering countries fishing in the SCS. A proper 
analysis framework for assessing the effects of fisheries subsidies, including consistent 
methodologies, should be developed for the SCS fisheries. This review and assessment 
should address the economic, environmental and social outcomes, potential trade-offs and 
cost-effectiveness, as well as taking into account the size of the impacts and the probabilities 





Given the production possibility set 𝑃𝑠 in a base time period s (i.e., year 1) as the reference 
technology, the output distance function of a decision-making unit (DMU) in time period s is 
defined as 𝐷𝑜
𝑠(𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝛿: (𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠/𝛿) ∈ 𝑃𝑠}, where 𝑥𝑠 is the set of inputs used in period 
s, 𝑦𝑠 is the set of outputs produced in period s and 𝛿 is the value of the distance function for a 
vessel using the input levels 𝑥𝑠 to produce the outputs 𝑦𝑠. The Malmquist (output-oriented) 
index of productivity change between period s and period t, which was defined by Caves et 
al. (1982), can be written as 𝑀𝑜
𝑠 = 𝑀𝑜
𝑠(𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦𝑡) = 𝐷𝑜
𝑠(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡)/𝐷𝑜
𝑠(𝑥𝑠, 𝑦𝑠), where 
𝐷𝑜
𝑠(𝑥𝑡, 𝑦𝑡) represents the distance from the period t observation to the period s technology.  
The 𝑀𝑜
𝑠 index will be affected by changes in efficiency among the periods and 
technical change (Färe et al., 1994). By making each DMU “efficient” in each time period 
through the appropriate radial expansion of their output levels, an equivalent set of efficient 
DMUs can be derived from the observed data by 𝑦𝑠
∗ = 𝑦𝑠/𝐷𝑜





∗ are the efficient levels of output given the level of inputs and the technology 
employed in periods s and t, respectively. Consequently, the differences in efficiency are 
removed and all the “efficient” DMUs will sit on the frontier relating to each period. As a 







∗), will represent the 
technical change, which is assumed to reflect the changes in stock abundance in the case of 
fisheries (Pascoe and Herrero, 2004). In this case, 𝑀𝑜
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